This paper investigates the predictions of a simple optimizing model of nominal price rigidity for the aggregate price level and the dynamics of inflation. I compare the model's predictions with those of a perfectly competitive, flexible price 'benchmark' model (corresponding to the model of pricing assumed in standard real business cycle models), and evaluate how much the introduction of nominal rigidities improves the model's fit with the data.
Introduction
This paper investigates the predictions of a simple model of optimal price-setting for the aggregate price level and the dynamics of inflation. The model incorporates nominal price rigidity, either in the form of convex costs of changing prices, as in the version proposed by Rotemberg (1982 Rotemberg ( , 1995 , or of delays between price adjustments, as in the version proposed by Calvo (1983) . I evaluate the model performance against a 'benchmark' model with flexible prices (the one corresponding to the model of pricing assumed in standard real business cycle models), by studying how much the model's deviations from the assumptions of the benchmark model improve the fit with U.S. data.
Following the lead of the RBC literature, much recent evaluation of optimizing models with nominal price rigidity has been conducted within a similar framework of general equilibrium models. Several papers consider the extent to which a fully specified quantitative general equilibrium model (including a complete specification of the stochastic properties of all random shocks affecting the economy) can account for various properties of aggregate time series. For example, King and Watson (1996) study, among other things, whether a stylized general equilibrium model with sticky prices, subject to both nominal and real shocks whose stochastic processes are calibrated on data of the US economy, is able to generate a price process with statistical properties (shape of the spectrum, sign and size of dynamic correlation with output) close to those of the actual data. Rotemberg (1995) studies whether a general equilibrium model with costs of adjusting prices delivers the same kind of correlation between predictable components of hours, output and prices, that can be estimated from an unrestricted V AR fitted to U.S. time series.
The approach that these papers, and others in the same spirit, take to comparing the implications of models with nominal rigidities with data on prices and quantities, inevitably involves a very large number of maintained hypotheses about the structure of the economy -for example, very specific assumptions about household preferences, about demographics, about wage-setting, about households' access to credit, and about how households' budgets and other constraints are affected by government policy -in addition to the assumed model of pricing and supply behavior by firms. Since many of these assumptions are highly debatable (for example, the Euler equations implied by a representative household model have been rejected by numerous econometric studies), it is unclear to what extent the failure of a given complete model's predictions to match U.S. data indicate misspecification of the model of pricing, or of some other aspect of the model entirely.
Other evidence on price stickiness is sought in papers that compare theoretical and estimated responses to a particular kind of exogenous shock. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) compare the predicted effects of an exogenous tightening of monetary policy in two models of the monetary transmission mechanism, that differ (among other respects) in their assumptions about price flexibility. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) use a model with nominal rigidity, parametrized so that the model's predicted response to monetary policy shocks matches the dynamic response estimated in the data, to simulate the consequences of alternative monetary policy rules. In these cases, the predictions of the models that are tested not only depend upon the joint specification of household and firm behavior, and of the nature of competition in several different markets, but are also sensitive to the validity of the assumptions used to identify particular exogenous disturbances in the data.
The approach that I propose here differs from these kinds of exercises in several respects. First, the model that is tested is not as ambitious; I do not specify a complete general equilibrium model of the economy, but instead test implications that depend only upon the firm's optimal pricing problem. In such a way I still have to make assumptions about market structure and production costs, but I can more easily understand the effect of each assumption on the results.
Second, rather than specifying the stochastic properties of the ultimate sources of randomness in the economy, I instead take as given the evolution of a number of state variables, and determine what path of prices is predicted by the evolution of these other variables, under the model of price determination considered. In this way I do not need to specify the source of the shock that determines deviations from a steady state equilibrium; the obvious advantage of proceeding in this way is that the results I obtain do not depend on some (more or less) arbitrary identification procedure to extract structural shocks from the residuals of an estimated time series model. Finally, my testing procedure is not based on the econometric estimation of the Euler equations implied by the specific model considered, but is instead closely related to the procedure used in a number of papers by Shiller (for example, 1987 and 1988) to test present-value models of stock prices. As in the case of the present-value theory of stock prices, the optimizing sticky-price models considered here give rise to a theoretical relation where the evolution of prices depends on the discounted sum of expected future labor costs. One can therefore construct the theoretical path of prices according to the model, taking as given the evolution of nominal labor compensation and labor productivity, and compare it to the data.
In the actual implementation, since prices are not a stationary series, I transform the present-value relationship into one where the price/unit labor cost ratio, which is stationary, depends upon the discounted sum of expected future labor cost growth, which is also a stationary variable. I then use V AR methodology to forecast the evolution of labor costs, and estimate the path of the price/unit labor cost ratio predicted by the sticky-price model: this path depends on a number of parameters, which I estimate as those for which the model best fits the data, in terms of matching both the level of the series, and its serial correlation properties. I also study the implications of the model for the path of inflation.
1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the implications of a competitive model of pricing behavior of the kind assumed in standard real business cycle models, which I will refer to as the 'benchmark' model. Motivated by the observation that the evolution of prices relative to unit labor costs is quite different from what is predicted by such a model, in section 3 I present two models with nominal rigidities, and discuss their theoretical predictions for the paths of prices and inflation. In particular, I show that both models imply a similar 'expectations augmented Phillips Curve' relationship, where inflation is a function of expected future inflation and current real marginal costs. Section 4 and 5 contain the empirical analysis. In section 4 I discuss the empirical fit of the model under the hypothesis that real marginal costs are well approximated by unit labor costs, and in section 5 I discuss the robustness of the empirical results both to alternative forecasting models of labor costs and to alternative measures of real marginal costs. Section 6 concludes.
My results can be summarized as follows. Models of imperfect competition with nominal price rigidity appear to deliver an extremely close approximation both to the evolution of the price/unit labor cost ratio and to the dynamics of the inflation process, not only when using a very simple (though familiar) measure of marginal costs, which assumes that they are proportional to unit labor costs, but also under some modifications that take into account potential biases in the measurement of labor productivity or real wages. Among the implications of this finding are not merely evidence for a significant degree of price stickiness in the U.S., but also important support for a forward-looking model of price setting. Finally, the degree of fit of the simple model suggests that neither variations in marginal costs unrelated to changes in unit labor costs, nor fluctuations in markups for reasons unrelated to price stickiness, are needed to explain the greater part of U.S. fluctuations in the aggregate price level.
A Competitive (Benchmark) Pricing Model
Consider a representative firm which produces a single good Y according to an aggregate Cobb-Douglas technology:
where K t and H t are respectively capital and labor inputs, the stochastic process Z t represents an aggregate labor-augmenting technological progress, and 0 < a < 1. Assuming that both output and input markets are perfectly competitive, profit maximization implies that, in equilibrium, real wages are equal to the marginal product of labor, or that
The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas technology implies that the marginal productivity of labor, MP L, is proportional to the average productivity of labor, AP L : MP L = (1−a)Y /H, and therefore:
where ν ≡ ln(1/(1 − a)); in words, this model of pricing behavior implies that the ratio of prices to unit labor cost (where unit labor cost, ULC, is the ratio of wages to labor productivity) is constant. To test the implications of this benchmark model, I consider the historical series of the price/unit labor cost ratio and inflation. The price series (P ) is the implicit deflator of GDP , W is compensation per hour, and AP L is average labor productivity (productivity per hour). All data are quarterly, from 1959:3 to 1997:1, and relate to the nonfarm private business sector. Figure 1 plots the historical behavior of these series together with the implied series of unit labor costs; 3 figure 2 plots the two series that I shall primarily seek to explain: the price/unit labor cost ratio and the inflation rate.
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Figure 2 also plots the predictions of the benchmark model for these last two series, given the evolution of unit labor costs shown in Fig.1 . While the model implies that the ratio of prices to unit labor costs is a constant, equal to the inverse of the output elasticity with respect to labor, the graph in the top panel of the figure shows that this implication is clearly counterfactual. The bottom panel, which compares actual inflation (solid line) with model inflation (dotted line), reveals also that the benchmark model overstates the variability of inflation quite significantly.
I now explore the extent to which allowing for nominal price rigidity can improve upon these predictions. Of course, the neglect of nominal price rigidity need not be the only way in which the benchmark model is mis-specified: Even within the context of a competitive model with flexible prices, one might consider various reasons why marginal costs may not move in exact proportion to unit labor costs. These include a non-Cobb-Douglas production function, the presence of overhead labor, the existence of adjustment costs for labor and/or variable labor utilization, and variations in other input margins, such as the capital stock, or intermediate inputs. The consequences of such factors for the proper measurement of marginal cost are taken up in Bils (1987) and Rotemberg-Woodford (1999) , and the contribution of such factors to the explanation of variations in the price/unit labor cost ratio (or, alternatively, the labor share) is considered in Blanchard (1997) and Sbordone (1999) .
Alternatively, one might consider imperfectly competitive flexible-price models where the price-cost margin is not constant because it is optimal for firms to vary it. Well-known examples include the 'customer market' model of Phelps and Winter (1970) , and the implicit collusion model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , which both imply that markups should as the ratio P t /M C t , is just (1 − a)P t /U LC t , and it is equal to 1).
vary as a function of the ratio of expected future profits to current sales. Preliminary study (Sbordone, 1999) indicates, however, that none of these factors alone can account for a very large fraction of the observed variability of the price/unit labor cost ratio in the U.S. data, though they can account for some of it. Instead, here I find that a very simple model of sticky prices, that abstracts from all of the complications just listed, does quite well. Moreover, while I leave to future work a more extensive investigation of the extent to which such additional factors may affect the empirical fit of sticky price models, I present below some evidence that the main results of this paper are quite robust to alternative measures of marginal costs.
In the following section, I explore the implications of two standard models of nominal price rigidity. They differ from the benchmark model in that firms supply their output in imperfectly competitive markets, and prices are not completely flexible. In the first, based on Rotemberg (1982) , this rigidity is due to firms facing, at any point in time, some convex cost of adjusting their price. In the second, based on Calvo (1983) , price rigidity is determined by a random draw of the firms that, at any point in time, are allowed to adjust their price. The objective is to derive the implications of the two models for the path of aggregate prices and inflation, compare these predictions to the data, and discuss the interpretation of the empirical results in terms of the key parameters measuring the degree of price stickiness in the two models, respectively the cost of adjusting prices, and the average time between price changes.
Models with Nominal Price Rigidity

A Model with Costs of Adjusting Prices
Unlike the benchmark model, in this model there is monopolistic competition among firms; I maintain, however, the assumption that each firm has a Cobb-Douglas technology, so that marginal cost can still be measured by unit labor cost. The possibility of markup fluctuations is created by introducing nominal rigidities, arising from some costs of adjusting prices that firms face every period (as in Rotemberg 1982 Rotemberg , 1995 .
The model has a continuum of monopolistic firms, indexed by i, which produce differentiated goods, also indexed by i. The demand curve for product i takes the form:
where θ is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods, and Y t is the aggregator function defined as
. Each firm i has a Cobb-Douglas production technology:
and faces convex costs of adjusting its own price P it , where these costs increase proportionally with the size of the economy:
is the aggregate price level. I assume that the convex function φ () takes its minimum value of zero when evaluated at the steady state value of ln(P it /P it−1 ), which I also take to be zero: thus φ(0) = φ (0) = 0 and φ > 0.
The objective of firm's i (supplier of good i ) is to maximize the expected sum of future discounted profits:
E t {Σ ∞ j=0 R t,t+j Π it+j } subject to the technology and the demand constraints. R t,t+j is a stochastic discount factor, and period t profits are given by:
The first order condition for the optimal choice of P it , evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, where P it = P t , H it = H t , Y it = Y t , for each period t and for all i, 5 implies that
where S t denotes the nominal marginal cost, and
, and where the mark-up µ t is defined as
Alternatively:
which, taking logarithms of both sides is
Unlike the benchmark model, the price/unit labor cost ratio in this model is not predicted to be a constant, but varies with µ t . To evaluate the theoretical behavior of prices, I therefore take a log-linear approximation of µ t around its steady state value µ * (where the assumptions made about the function φ( ) imply that µ * = θ θ−1 ). The approximation gives
where R is the steady-state value of the discount factor R t,t+1 . This equation can be written as
where α 0 (≡ φ (0)/(θ − 1)) is a measure of the curvature of the adjustment cost function, and α 1 (= Rγ * y ) reflects the steady state growth of output; conveniently rewritten, by using 5 See Appendix, section 7.1, for details of the calculations.
6 See Appendix, section 7.1.2.
expression (3.5) to substitute for ln µ t (where ln µ t = µ t + ln µ * ) it describes the dynamic of inflation in terms of future expected inflation and average real marginal costs:
where lowercase letters denote natural logs of the corresponding upper case letters, and κ = ln((1 − a)(θ − 1)/θ).The implied path of aggregate prices is easily derived: writing the above equation as an expression for unit labor costs:
and solving this expression for the optimal price path, one solves for prices as a weighted average of past prices and expected future unit labor costs
where λ 1 and λ 2 are the real roots of the characteristic polynomial of the difference equation
Denoting by F t the forward-looking component term which is in square brackets (F
, can be conveniently rewritten as
This equation forms the basis for the computation of the theoretical path of prices.
A Model with Random Intervals Between Price Changes
Before turning to the empirical evaluation of the model, I want to show how it is possible to derive eq. (3.8) from a different hypothesis about nominal rigidities, like that formulated by Calvo (1983) . The fact that this alternative model yields a supply curve as that implied by the Rotemberg model was first shown by Rotemberg (1987) 8 , although he does not derive an equation corresponding to (3.8) for either model, and therefore does not discuss the interpretation of the price stickiness parameter α 0 that is estimated here. Many recent derivations of the aggregate supply relation implied by a discrete-time version of the Calvo model, like that of Woodford (1996) , similarly omit any explicit treatment of the factor markets, and so obtain no equation relating prices to labor costs. Finally, even those derivations that do include the labor market, such as those of Yun (1996) , King and Watson (1996) , or Goodfriend and King (1997) , make a different assumption than mine about factor mobility among 7 See Appendix, section 7.1.3.
8 See also Roberts (1995) .
firms, that has an important effect upon the interpretation of α 0 . Hence it is useful to review the implications of this model, emphasizing its consequences for the relation between prices and unit labor costs, and reviewing the nature of the two models' observational equivalence, for the light that it sheds on the price stickiness parameter α 0 .
As in the previous model, there is a continuum of firms, each operating with a CobbDouglas technology (3.2), and facing a demand curve as (3.1); in addition, in every period, a fraction (1 − α) of the firms can set a new price, independently of the past history of price changes, which will then be kept fixed until the next time the firm is drawn to change prices again. This set-up implies that the expected time between price changes is
. By letting α vary between 0 and 1, the model nests a wide range of assumptions about the degree of price stickiness, from perfect flexibility (α = 0) to complete price rigidity (the limit as α → 1).
The pricing problem of a firm that revises its price in period t is again to choose its price, which I will indicate as X it , to maximize its expected stream of profits, which is
Then the first order condition for the optimal price is
where, because each firm that is allowed to change prices solves the same problem, I have suppressed the subscript i on X t (although I need to maintain it for output and hours, to distinguish individual from aggregate quantities). Rewriting this expression as
and denoting by S t+j,t the marginal cost of producing , at date t + j, goods whose price was set at time t (so S t+j,t ≡
), one can substitute the demand constraint for Y it+j , to get:
Finally, dividing this expression by P t , and defining x t ≡ X t /P t and s t+j,t ≡ S t+j,t /P t+j , one can rewrite it as
This optimal pricing condition, combined with the distribution of aggregate prices at any point in time, allows one to describe the path of aggregate prices and inflation in this model.
The distribution of aggregate prices at time t is a mixture of the distribution of prices of the previous period (since all previous prices have the same probability of being changed), with weight α, and the new price X t , with weight (1 − α)
Dividing both sides by P t , and defining π t ≡ P t /P t−1 , a log linear approximation of this expression is:
Similarly, a log-linear approximation of (3.12) around
, and π * (≡ 1), gives:
where again R is the steady state value of the stochastic discount factor R t,t+j , and γ * y is the steady state growth rate of output. Combining expressions (3.14) and (3.15) one obtains a relationship between current and expected inflation of the kind obtained for the model with cost of adjusting prices.
To get such a relationship, we should write explicitly what the marginal cost is. Using the production technology to express hours in terms of output, and the demand constraint, we get
under the assumption that firms' relative capital stocks do not vary with their relative prices, or relative production levels. (This means that I assume that capital is not reallocated across firms istantaneously, so as to equate the shadow price of capital services at all times, as assumed in papers such as Yun (1996) and Goodfriend and King (1997) .)
This expression shows that the real marginal cost of the firms that are allowed to charge a new price need not be the same as the average level of real marginal cost for firms in general, which is the term in brackets (
(The data on unit labor costs measure the average level of costs, of course, not the level specific to firm i). In this model, the extent to which, at any point in time, firms charge different relative prices, determines firms' different levels of sales, and hence their different levels of marginal costs. Specifically,
A log linear approximation of this equation around the steady state values of s t+j,t and x t gives
Substituting (3.17) into (3.15), using the relationship between π t and x t of eq.(3.14), and further simplifying 9 one gets
where now α 0 ≡
and again α 1 ≡ R γ * y . Like eq.(3.8) of the previous model, where firms face costs of adjusting prices, the pricing behavior of the firms in this model leads to a similar implication about inflation dynamics: Inflation depends on expected future inflation and real marginal costs. This correspondence allows one to interpret the estimate of the cost of adjusting prices (the parameter α 0 ) of the first model with nominal rigidities examined, in terms of the average expected time between price changes (the parameter 1/(1 − α)), that characterizes this model.
It should be noted that the assumption that we need to make about capital mobility in this model affects only the quantitative interpretation of this correspondence. In the case in which the marginal cost of the firms that set new prices is not different from the average marginal cost, because capital is istantaneously reallocated across firms to equalize the shadow price of capital services, s t+j,t = s avg t+j , and the parameter α 0 in expression (3.18) simplifies to
; but the nature of the relationship that describes inflation dynamics remains unaltered.
Empirical Results
The Fit of the Model
I now proceed to evaluate the empirical predictions of the model with cost of adjusting prices: using a forecasting model to compute expectations of future unit labor cost, I derive the predicted path of the price level according to eq.(3.10), and discuss the parameter choice that best fits the model to the data. To compute the expected future unit labor costs, I assume that all information at time t about current and future values of the unit labor cost can be summarized by a vector of variables Z t , which include the unit labor cost, and also that {Z t } is a stationary Markov process: Z t+1 = ΓZ t + ε Zt+1 . Given a forecast for the unit labor costs, and parameter values for λ 1 and λ 2 , one can compute the path of prices implied by (3.10), and therefore the path of the two series of interest, namely the price/unit labor cost ratio, and the inflation process.
9 See section 7.2 of the Appendix.
The model is then evaluated by measuring its ability to match the actual behavior of these two series and their serial correlation properties.
As a criterion function to evaluate the goodness of fit of the model I choose the variance of the distance between the model and the data: such distance measures the error that one commits when approximating the data with the model prediction. I therefore select for the model parameters the values that minimize this criterion function.
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Let p t be defined as: (1) processes, while assuming that the price/unit labor cost ratio is stationary. The vector of the V AR model therefore includes the rate of change of the unit labor cost (which corresponds to γ ulc,t in the model), and the (log of the) ratio of prices to unit labor costs. Two lags of the dependent variables are included. 13 Denoting by X t the vector of dependent variables
The choice of this V AR specification as baseline model is motivated by the objective of obtaining a parsimonious, but sufficiently good, forecast of the unit labor cost. This specification captures about 40% of unit labor costs volatility, so that the fitted value moves closely to the actual series.
14 I test whether the data support the sticky price model by studying whether the value of the endogenous variable implied by the structural model, for a given forecast of the forcing variable, matches the actual observed behavior of the series.
The statistical properties of the optimal price process, and therefore of the price/cost ratio and inflation, in the theoretical model, depend upon the parameters λ 1 and λ 2 , which are the roots of the polynomial P (λ) = 0, and therefore depend upon the parameters α 0 and α 1 . Of these parameters, the most important is α 0 , which measures the curvature of the cost of price adjustment. The parameter α 1 , equal to γ * y R, is approximately equal to 1, if one approximates the steady state value of output growth with its average over the sample period considered, 15 and assumes, quite reasonably, a discount factor R almost equal to 1. In the results presented here, I therefore set α 1 = 1, 16 and, to estimate α 0 , for the given value of α 1 , I search over the space of positive values of α 0 to find the value that minimizes the variance of the distance between the ratio of prices to unit labor costs implied by the model, and the corresponding ratio computed in the data. 17 This value (see figure 3) 
Setting α 0 equal to the optimal value of 18.3, I then construct a theoretical prices series, and ask the question of how much closer to the actual data this theoretical price series is, compared to the one predicted by the 'benchmark' flexible price model. Comparing the variance of the distance between the benchmark model and the data (2.986 * 10 −4 ) with the variance of the distance between the sticky price model and the data (.363 * 10 −4 ) I obtain that the latter is about 88% lower than the variance of the distance between the price/ unit labor cost predicted by the benchmark model and the data. Figures 4 and 5 plot the theoretical series of the price/ unit labor cost ratio and inflation, constructed under this parametrization, with the data. For both series, the fit is quite good. For comparison, one should look again at figure 2b, where the same inflation data are plotted against the inflation series predicted by the benchmark model. It is clear that in the sticky price model inflation volatility is notably reduced, compared to the benchmark model (a reduction of 60%), and the variance of the distance between the model inflation and data is reduced by about 94%, compared to the benchmark model (these numbers, with further results, are reported in Table 1 ). In other words, the discrepancy between actual inflation and the theoretical inflation predicted by the sticky price model is reduced to a mere 6% of what it would have been in the absence of nominal rigidities. Moreover, the model can account quite well for the persistence properties of both series: figs. 6a and 6b show that the autocorrelations of the predicted series are close to the sample correlations, and well within the confidence bands.
19 15 This approximation gives γ * y = 1.0084. 16 I consider later the consequences of treating α 1 as a free parameter as well. 17 Because I forecast the rate of change of unit labor costs, I use a transformation of eq.(3.10) that directly computes the theoretical price/unit labor cost ratio. See appendix, section 6.1.3. 18 The standard error for this parameter, computed via a non linear least squares routine, is 3.9.
19 The model accounts also reasonably well of the autocovariance function of the series. Only for the price/unit labor cost ratio, the autocovariances for the first three lags are slightly underpredicted.
A Further Test of the Model Restrictions: Do the Forward-looking Terms
Matter?
A crucial feature of this model is the importance assigned to forward-looking determinants of price-setting behavior. This feature represents an important departure from the older literature on price/cost margins. A typical price equation from the 1960's (see, e.g., Eckstein and Fromm, 1968 ) posits prices as a function of unit labor costs, but includes only the current and lagged values of these costs as explanatory variables. Other variables typically enter the regression to account for other cost or demand factors. Here expectations of future unit labor costs also enter, with a substantial weight. And interestingly, other variables, such as materials prices or the ratio of unfilled orders to sales, are not needed in order to account for a very large fraction of the overall variation in the price level. A possible interpretation, consistent with the theoretical framework proposed here, is that these other variables entered significantly in traditional price equations because they were proxies for the omitted expectational terms. In that case, treating these estimated equations as structural for purposes of policy analysis would be vulnerable to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) . 
, which is the formulation estimated, for example, in Roberts (1995) . Estimates of this curve are often discussed as a test of nominal rigidities, or of the role of forward looking behavior in the price setting mechanism. For example, Fuhrer's (1997) empirical results point to a negligible role of future inflation in an estimated inflation-output relationship, specified in a way that is intended to nest the 'New Keynesian' Phillips Curve specification (4.2), the more complex variant proposed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , and purely backward-looking Phillips Curve specifications. Roberts (1997 Roberts ( , 1998 instead argues that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve fits reasonably well when survey measures of inflation expectations are used to estimate it, but that it does not fit well under the hypothesis of rational expectations. He thus proposes a model with an important backward-looking component in the inflation expectations, which amounts to weakening the weight put on the forward-looking terms in his aggregate supply relation.
Here I propose instead to address the question of whether the forward-looking term in my pricing equation matters, abstracting from any assumption about how marginal costs are related to the level of economic activity.
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From the definition of F t in eq. (3.10), one sees that the expected evolution of unit labor costs in the future matters only insofar as the parameter λ −1 2 = 0. Moreover, the model implies that the parameters λ 1 and λ 2 are constrained to be in a specific relationship with the structural parameters α 0 and α 1 . To test these implications, I reestimated the price equation without imposing the constraints on λ 1 and λ 2 . The results reported below indicate that both parameters are statistically significant; moreover, although a formal test rejects the hypothesis that the product of λ 1 and λ 2 is equal to 1, as the assumption I made of α 1 = 1 in the model implies, 21 the surface plot in fig. 7 shows that no significant reduction of the distance between model and data could be achieved if λ −1 2 is not close to the value of λ 1 .
Unconstrained parameter estimates
These results suggest that the forward looking component in the price equation is quite important. They also suggest that the inflation dynamics implied by this forward-looking model, according to which inflation is a function of expected future inflation and real marginal costs, does indeed describe very closely the dynamics of the data. As a consequence, it may not be necessary to hypothesize forms of departure from full rationality (as Roberts 1997, 1998 does), or to introduce additional inertia in the inflation process (as in Fuhrer 1997 ). If there is a mis-specification in the inflation-output relationship described by the NewKeynesian Phillips Curve , this may not be due to the theoretical link between inflation and real marginal costs, but to the additional assumptions made about the relationship between marginal costs and output.
Some evidence in this sense is provided by an analysis of the dynamic cross-correlations of inflation and unit labor costs. Estrella and Fuhrer (1998) criticize the NKPC model for its inability to account for the correlation between inflation and output gap that one observes in the data. Specifically, they contrast the virtual zero correlation between inflation and lagged output gap predicted by that model with the positive correlation between inflation and lagged output gap estimated in the data. A model with a backward looking Phillips curve instead, they further show, generates the same correlation between inflation and lagged output gap that is observed in the data.
But while data on the output gap and inflation may be inconsistent with the NewKeynesian Phillips curve, this is not the case for the data on unit labor costs and inflation 23 , which, as I have argued, are the two variables on whose behavior the rational expectations model of price setting with nominal rigidities directly sets restrictions. Looking at these dynamic cross-correlations ( see fig. 8 ), one sees that, although the model predicts correlations between inflation and unit labor costs higher than the ones estimated in the data, it correctly predicts the lead-lag relationship that characterizes the data.
I take this as evidence that what is at fault in the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve specification is not the forward-looking model of price setting but the assumed proportionality between marginal costs and measures of the output gap.
Interpretation of the Degree of Stickiness
In the empirical literature, convex costs of adjusting prices are often further specified to be quadratic, for the purpose of econometric estimation. Among recent studies, Roberts, Stockton and Struckmeyer (1994) estimate an econometric model of imperfectly competitive firms with U.S. industry data, and find relatively small values for the adjustment cost parameter: 0.57 for the manufacturing sector, and values ranging from insignificantly different from zero to significant 2.8 for the individual two-digit sectors. In another study, Ireland (1996) estimates a small, structural, general equilibrium model for the U.S. economy, in which firms face quadratic costs of adjusting prices, and obtains an estimate of 4.05 for the coefficient of the quadratic cost function. A direct comparison with these studies is, however, difficult. Unlike the first paper, the estimates obtained here use quarterly, aggregate data, and a different econometric approach; unlike the second paper, the results do not depend upon a number of assumptions that go beyond the specific price mechanism. In interpreting the size of the parameter α 0 , anyway, it is worth stressing again that, although the optimal value is estimated to be 18.3, and may at first glance seem too high compared to those other estimates, the goodness of fit of the price/ unit labor cost in this model is significant, even for much lower values of this parameter; as fig. 3 shows, the largest gain over the benchmark flexprice model occurs when α 0 moves from 0 to around 4.
A useful way to interpret the degree of stickiness implied by costs of adjusting prices of the size estimated, is in terms of its implications for the length of the expected time between price changes implied by the Calvo model of section 3.2. Consider equation (3.18) : in the case in which all firms face the same real marginal cost, α 0 =
where the second inequality follows from the imposed value of 1 for α 1 (≡ Rγ * y ). In this case, (which, given the estimated long run growth of output, implies a discount rate R = .996), the estimated value of the cost of adjusting prices (α 0 = 18.3) is consistent with an average expected time between price changes (1/ (1 − α) ) of about 14 months. As argued before, however, a more realistic case is one in which there is a wedge between the firm's and the average real marginal cost, in which case the stickiness parameter is α 0 =
: it may therefore be important which values one wants to assume for the share of capital a and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods θ. For example, still for the case of an implied discount rate R = .996, the estimated value of α 0 is consistent with a = .25, θ = 6 (which implies an average value of markup of 1.2, since µ * = θ/(θ − 1)), and 1/3 of the firms changing prices at any point in time (α = .66); in this case the average time between price changes is about 9 months. Increasing the average value of markup (i.e. lowering θ), for any given value of the capital share a, increases modestly the estimated value of α: for example, an average markup of 1.6, for a = .25, brings the fraction α to .72, and the estimated average time between price changes to slightly less than 11 months. Conversely, for any given value of θ, increasing the assumed capital share reduces the fraction α: for example, for θ = 6 , increasing the capital share to 1/3, makes the estimated value of the cost of adjusting prices consistent with 63% of the firms keeping prices constant from one period to the other, which implies an average expected time between price changes again of little above 8 months. In fact, one observes that an increase in the degree of monopolistic competition makes the estimated cost of adjusting prices consistent with longer intervals between price changes.
Summing up, varying the parameters calibration within the range discussed suggests an estimated range of price inertia between 2 1 2 and 3 1 2 quarters. These numbers are in line with survey evidence on the frequency of price adjustment: for example, in a survey of about 200 manufacturing firms, Blinder et al. (1998) report that 65% of the firms claim between one and two price changes over the year; also, the median time between price changes appears to be 9 months.
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The following table summarizes the 'goodness of fit' of the model, measured by the reduction of the distance between model and data, for several values of the cost of adjusting prices, interpreted in terms of the average time between price adjustments, using benchmark values for a and θ. The third column reports, for each value of the parameter α 0 , the variance of the 'error' of the model (defined as the distance between theoretical and actual paths of prices), and the next two columns report the reduction in this variance, with respect to the variance of the benchmark model. The table shows that even for a size of the adjustment cost corresponding to much lower price inertia (for example α 0 = 2, which corresponds to an average expected time between price changes of less than two quarters), the goodness of fit of this model is about 40% higher than that of the benchmark model.
Robustness Analysis
In this section, I address the issue of how sensitive the results that I presented are to alternative specification of the forecasting model, and, even more importantly, how sensitive they are to the particular measure of marginal cost that I used.
Robustness to the Specification of the Forecasting System
As I argued before, the choice of the 'baseline' forecasting model can be motivated in a manner similar to the Campbell-Shiller methodology to test other present value relationships.
However, one doesn't necessarily have to exclude from the information set other variables that are known at time t, if they may in fact help forecasting the unit labor cost, beyond the contribution of past price/unit labor cost ratios. Alternatively, one may argue that data on the price level should not be used in the construction of unit labor costs, so that the predicted price level and inflation series can be constructed with no reference at all to the actual price level data.
To look at these issues I report below the results of my structural estimation under two alternative V AR models. The first augments the baseline V AR by including hours worked in the non-farm business sector 25 . The second eliminates altogether prices from the forecasting equations, and includes instead output and hours. While there is reason to believe that, as proxies of the level of economic activity, both hours and output growth could help in forecasting unit labor costs, these alternative specifications do not improve upon the baseline specification in terms of their ability to account for the variability of unit labor costs. However, they are worth exploring because they are still able to explain about 40% of the variability of unit labor costs.
26
As one can see from table 2 below, while the point estimates of the parameters and the measures of fit are somewhat different, the quality of the results does not change. 
27
As the table shows, both these specifications lead to a price equation that still fits qualitatively very well, although it improves upon the benchmark model fit to a lower degree (the first model reduces the theoretical error in the price/cost ratio by about 70%, and the one in inflation by about 90%, the second respectively by about 55% and 80%). Interestingly, however, the best fit is obtained with a lower value of the cost of the price stickiness parameter α 0 . Moreover, in both specifications, the hypothesis that α 1 = 1 is not rejected by the data. Finally, as in the baseline case, despite a close approximation to the serial correlation properties of prices and inflation, the autocovariance function of the price/ unit labor cost ratio is somewhat 'flatter' than the one in the data.
Of course, if the theoretical model is correct, one would expect that the price/unit labor cost ratio should be a good variable in the forecasting regression for future changes in the unit labor cost, so it is not surprising that a V AR that excludes the price/unit labor cost ratio yields somewhat worse results. 25 Since this specification allows to construct also a forecast of hours worked, this model is used as baseline VAR in the next subsection as well, when such a forecast is needed to correct the forecast of marginal cost. 26 I also explored a simple univariate autoregressive model to forecast unit labor cost; since its fit is significantly worse than any VAR model that I tried, I do not report the results here. 27 The hypothesis of a stochastic trend is strongly rejected in the hours data (while there is a significant deterministic trend), and not rejected for GDP. I therefore include in the VAR a detrended level of hours (h dt indicates deviation from a linear deterministic trend) and the rate of growth of output. 
Robustness to Alternative Measures of Marginal Cost
The analysis conducted so far uses unit labor costs as a proxy for marginal cost, which is the forcing variable in the price equation implied by the sticky-price models considered. The use of this proxy was justified by the hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas production function, and the assumption that no other frictions were breaking the proportionality between marginal and average labor cost. Although these assumptions are very frequently made in the business cycle literature, several authors have pointed out that there are various reasons why unit labor costs may not be proportional to marginal cost (see Rotemberg-Woodford 1999 for an extensive discussion). While I pursue elsewhere a more extensive study of the empirical importance of a number of departures from the baseline model presented above, here I present results for two models, which illustrate two different classes of factors that might cause average and marginal cost to vary differently.
The first is a model with variable labor effort due to the existence of costs in adjusting labor. In this model marginal cost is not proportional to average labor cost because of a 'real wage bias': the marginal cost of hours is not equal to the wage. The second model considers the existence of overhead labor. In this case marginal cost is not proportional to average labor cost because of a 'productivity bias': the growth rate of the effective variable input is larger than the growth rate of total labor hours, which is used to compute unit labor costs.
Adjustment Costs for Labor
The model with labor adjustment costs follows Sbordone (1996) , where optimizing firms employ effort variations because they face adjustment costs for increasing hours of work. The model of section 3 is therefore modified by adding to the basic wage level a cost of adjusting
, where λ(.) is a convex function representing the cost associated with rapid increases in hours. The first-order condition for optimal pricing, evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, 28 now gives the real marginal cost as
where Ω t is
and γ Ht = H t /H t−1 . Taking logarithms of both sides, expression (5.1) gives
There is now a time-varying wedge between real marginal cost and real average cost represented by the function Ω t . To evaluate this function, I take a log-linear approximation of expression (5.2) around the steady state value Ω * to obtain 30 , and set δ 1 = 1, using the average rate of growth of hours and wages as an estimate of the steady state growth level of these variables, and a discount rate approximately equal to 1. With the modified measure of marginal cost, I proceed to evaluate the sticky-price model as before. Since I need to compute a forecast of hours to evaluate the function Ω t , to forecast both unit labor costs and hours I use now the 3-variable V AR in unit labor cost growth, price/unit labor cost ratio, and detrended hours discussed above.
The first row of table 3 reports the results of the evaluation of the sticky-price model modified with the introduction of labor adjustment cost. To evaluate the effect of the introduced modification in the measure of marginal cost, one should compare the numbers to those in the first row of table 2, which reports the performance of the baseline sticky-price model, conditional to the same forecasting VAR model. The estimated value of the stickiness parameter α 0 is slightly higher, and corresponds to an increase of about half a month in the approximate interval between price changes. The fit of the model, as measured by its gain 28 See Appendix, section 7.3, for details of the calculations. 29 Note that Ω * =1, by the assumptions that the cost of adjusting hours has a minimum of zero at the steady state level of hours growth, i.e., that λ(γ * H ) = λ (γ * H ) = 0. 30 Sbordone (1996) , using annual data for the two-digit industries in the manufacturing sector, estimates adjustment cost parameters, on average, of about . 25. compared to the benchmark flexible price model, is still fairly good: the theoretical error in the price/cost ratio is reduced by about 60% and that in inflation by more than 80%. Figs. 9 and 10 show the model approximation to the data. Like the baseline model, this variant generates a degree of persistence, both in inflation and in the price/ unit labor cost ratio similar to that found in the data (see fig. 11 ).
Increasing the size of the adjustment cost leads to a slow decline in the variance reduction statistics, and seems to require a moderately higher degree of nominal rigidity to maintain a good fit. 31 Overall, I would conclude that, for a reasonable size of labor adjustment costs, the resulting discrepancy between marginal and average labor cost doesn't significantly affect the fit of the sticky-price model.
Overhead Labor
In this case, the model of section 3 needs to be modified to include in the production function only the amount of hours in excess of the 'overhead labor' H ≥ 0 (the hours that need to be hired regardless of the level of production). Eq. (2.1) is modified as
The appropriate correction to unit labor cost to better approximate marginal costs involves adding to eq. with respect to H (and it is therefore negative), and h dt t represents log-deviation of (detrended) hours from their steady state level. Following Rotemberg-Woodford (1999) , I set β = −.3: the empirical evaluation of the sticky price model, under this corrected measure of marginal cost, is in the second row of table 3. The table shows that the estimate of α 0 is only marginally higher than that of the baseline case, so that the implications of this estimate for the expected time between price changes remains basically the same; moreover, as in the previous model, in this case as well the imposed constraint of α 1 = 1 is not rejected. The ability of the model to fit inflation data remains pretty good: the variance of the discrepancy between the inflation data and the inflation predicted by the model is reduced to only 15% of what it would predicted by a flexible price model (V ( π t ) = 85%), although the fit of the level is slightly worse: the variance of the discrepancy between the price series and the one predicted by the evolution of unit labor costs is reduced only by 60%.
How sensitive are these results to variations in the value of the calibrated parameter β? An increase in the absolute value of β (a larger departure from the baseline sticky-price 31 For example, doubling the size of the adjustment cost parameter (δ 0 = 8) increases α 0 to 21.9 (which corresponds to an expected time between price changes of slightly less than 10 months), maintaining the ability of the model to reduce the variance of p t by about 50% and that of the inflation distance by about 70%. model) rises mildly the estimated degree of nominal rigidity and slightly reduces the 'gain' of the model with respect to the benchmark flex-price model; but, as in the previous case, the qualitative implications of the sticky price model still hold. Overall, these results suggest that modifications to unit labor costs of the sort sometimes proposed as better measures of marginal costs do not significantly alter the main results. While the preliminary investigation presented in this section does suggest that allowing for modifications in the measurement of productivity or wages may require a slightly higher degree of nominal rigidity, this higher rigidity is still within ranges that, on the basis of survey evidence, we should believe perfectly plausible: intervals between price adjustments no longer than a year. Finally, it is worth noting that neither of the alternative measures of marginal cost considered here improves the fit of the model; insofar as the behavior of prices is used to infer the character of marginal cost, we find no evidence that either of these proposed modifications provide a better measure of marginal cost.
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Conclusion
This paper derives the implications of two models with nominal rigidities about the path of aggregate prices and inflation dynamics; it shows that such simple models deliver a good approximation to both the price/ unit labor cost ratio and the inflation process. In particular, by introducing some degree of price stickiness, either in the form of small costs for all the firms to adjust prices, or in the form of random intervals between price changes, the model 32 For example, a value of the elasticity β = −.5 increases α 0 to 16.5, maintaining the ability of the model to reduce the variance of p t by about 50% and that of the inflation distance by about 80%.
predicts that aggregate prices are driven by the anticipated behavior of unit labor cost, and this predicted behavior describes quite well the actual behavior of prices.
This result is potentially interesting for two brands of the literature. On one hand, it shows that nominal rigidities are a reasonable component of a complete macroeconomic model. The failure of existing general-equilibrium models which incorporate nominal rigidities to account for all features of observed time series (see King-Watson 1996 , Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1997) may not be due to a misspecified pricing equation, but rather to other features of these models (that they share with standard real business cycle models).
Secondly, the result is relevant for the literature on estimation of aggregate supply curves. It may redirect both the theoretical and empirical effort towards understanding the determinants of marginal costs and the relationship between marginal cost and output, rather than to further refinements of models of price adjustment. If one believes the results of this paper, to explain price behavior one should not necessarily look for other shocks (like energy price shock, for example), that alter the price-labor cost relationship, nor postulate additional stickiness in the inflation rate (as opposed to the price level), as in the FRB-US model (see Brayton and Tinsley, 1996) and the model of Furher and Moore (1995) . What one most needs, instead, is an empirically successful model of the dynamics of unit labor costs. 
From the demand of good i:
Using (7.2) and (7.3), the partial derivative of profits at time t is:
and
The first order condition for the optimal choice of P it , ∂Π t /P it + E t R t,t+1 ∂Π t+1 /P it = 0, is then:
where I divided the whole expression by Y it . Rearranging:
Evaluating this expression at a symmetric equilibrium (where Y it = Y t , H it = H t and P it = P t ) :
Denoting the right hand side expression by
, we get expression (3.4) in the text.
Evaluate µ t
By assumption, φ(0) = φ (0) = 0, and therefore:
and α 1 = γ * y R, this expression gives (3.7) in the text.
Solving for the optimal path of prices
Start from eq.(3.7) in the text, which is
By definition, µ t = ln µ t − ln µ * = ln µ t − ln(θ/(θ − 1)), so eq.(7.4) becomes:
Substitute ln µ t from eq . (3.5) in the text, and use lowercase letters for logs:
Explicitly writing the price differences:
where the assumptions α 0 > 0 and 0 < α 1 ≤ 1 imply that the two roots of the polynomial P(λ) = 0 are real λ 1 , λ 2 satisfying 0 < λ 1 < 1, and λ 2 > α
from which x t = (α 0 α 1 λ 2 ) −1 (ulc t − κ) + λ 
Computation of the theoretical price path
Because the estimated V AR delivers forecast of the rate of change of the unit labor cost, ∆ulc t+j ,the actual equation used to compute the theoretical price path is a transformation of eq.(3.10). Using the fact that which is eq. (3.18) in the text.
Sticky-Price Model with Cost of Adjusting Labor
We modify here the model of sect. 7.1 by assuming that firm i faces also convex costs of adjusting labor
where the nominal wage W t is still determined on a competitive market. The first order condition for profit maximization: ∂Π it /∂P it + E t R t,t+1 ∂Π it+1 /∂P it = 0 is now modified as: To evaluate the function Ω t I take a log linear approximation around its steady state value Ω * (where Ω * = 1) :
Ω t ≡ ln Ω t = δ 0 γ Ht − δ 1 E t γ Ht+1 (7.10) Substituting (7.10) in the log-linearization of (7.9), and using (7.4), I obtain , and α 1 = Rγ * y . Eq. (7.11) is a second order difference equation in the price level, and can be solved for the evolution of prices as in the previous case. Comparing (7.11 ) and eq. (3.8) in the text, one sees that the introduction of cost of adjusting labor requires to modify the measure of marginal cost by the term δ 0 γ Ht − δ 1 E t γ Ht+1 .
In the specific implementation, I solve for
2 E t (∆ulc t+j ) + (7.12)
2 )δ 0
